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Ownership Structure, Board of Directors and Firm Performance:  
Evidence from Taiwan 
Purpose 
Using a dataset of listed firms domiciled in Taiwan, the main aim of this paper is empirically 
assess the effects of ownership structure, board of directors on firm value.  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1997 to 2015, the study uses a panel estimation 
to exploit both the cross-section and time-series nature of the data. Furthermore, a 2SLS 




Our main results show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the 
board size, and together with a two-tier board system and no CEO duality, the stronger the 
firm’s performance. With respect to ownership structure, block-holders’ ownership, 




Although the Taiwanese corporate governance reform concerning the independent director 
system which is mandatory only for newly-listed companies is a successful, the regulatory 
authority should require all listed companies to appoint independent directors to further 
enhance the Taiwanese corporate governance. 
 
Originality/value 
First, unlike much of the previous literature on western developed countries, this study 
examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in a newly-
industrialised country, Taiwan. Second, while a number of studies use a single indicator of firm 
performance this study examines both accounting-based and market-based firm performance. 
Third, this study addresses the endogeneity issue between corporate governance factors and 
firm performance by using two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, and details the 










Ownership Structure, Board of Directors and Firm Performance:  
Evidence from Taiwan 
1. Introduction 
Poor corporate governance has been cited as one of the major reasons that led to the global 
financial crisis. Furthermore, prior to a number of corporate debacles, corporate governance 
was not considered as an important issue in many jurisdictions outside the US and Europe. In 
Taiwan, corporate governance became a major and controversial issue only at the beginning of 
the 21st century when the Taiwanese authorities started to introduce and implement a series of 
corporate governance reforms. These reforms are aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s corporate 
governance, and amongst others include the amendment of the Company Act, the Securities 
and Exchange Act and other related regulations, the introduction of an independent director 
system and audit committee, and the promotion of shareholders’ rights. Using a dataset of listed 
firms domiciled in Taiwan, the main aim of this paper is empirically assess the effects of 
ownership structure, board of directors on firm value.  
The link between corporate governance and firm performance is important in formulating 
efficient corporate management and public regulatory policies. However, prior literature 
focuses mainly on the corporate governance practices in the UK, US and other western 
developed countries (e.g., Cavaco et al., 2016; Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Wintoki et al., 
2012; Yermack, 1996). However, elsewhere, particularly in Asia, firms operate with a different 
culture and in a distinctive legal and institutional framework, which may have a material effect 
on corporate governance-firm performance relationships (Piesse et al., 2007). Although some 
studies also look at new growing economies (e.g. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) in Malaysia and 
Singapore; Cho and Kim (2007) and Black et al. (2015) in Korea), the focus of this research is 
on Taiwan, which is a newly-industrialised economy that has developed at an impressive rate, 
and which has a distinctive corporate governance framework such as the supervisory system 
that is different from most countries. In addition, it has now been several years since the 
corporate governance reforms were introduced in Taiwan in early 2002. Accordingly, since 
these reforms which require public companies to improve their corporate governance have now 
been enforced for a period of time, it is a valuable research agenda to investigate whether the 
new policies are making Taiwanese public companies perform better. 
We use a dataset from Taiwan which provides a suitable background as a newly-industrialised 
market for our empirical analysis to examine the effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance. First, as an internal governance mechanism, the board of directors plays an 
important role in monitoring the management and reducing the agency problem between 
managers and shareholders (Drakos and Bekiris, 2010), and hence may improve firm 
performance (Cho and Kim, 2007; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Weir 
et al., 2002). In particular, we assess the impact of board characteristics (i.e., the proportion of 
independent directors and independent supervisors, board size, and role duality) on firm 
performance. Second, we focus on the external governance mechanism of ownership structure 
(i.e., block-holders’ ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family 
ownership), which may also display considerable change after the corporate governance reform, 
and thus might be another determinant of firm performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Dwivedi and Jain, 2005; Piesse et al., 2007). Our main results 
show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the board size, and 
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together with a two-tier board system and no CEO duality, the stronger the firm’s performance. 
These results are consistent with Mak and Kusnadi (2005), Cho and Kim (2007), Guest (2009), 
and Drakos and Bekiris (2010). With respect to ownership structure, in line with Filatotchev et 
al. (2005), Maury (2006), Andres (2008), and Bonilla et al. (2010), block-holders’ ownership, 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership, are all positively related to 
firm value. 
This study contributes to the corporate governance literature in several ways. First, unlike much 
of the previous literature on western developed countries (e.g., Andres, 2008; Bhagat and Black, 
2001; De Andres et al., 2005), this study examines the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance in a newly-industrialised country, Taiwan. Second, while a 
number of studies use a single indicator of firm performance (e.g., Dahya and McConnell, 2007; 
Wintoki et al., 2012; Yermack, 1996), this study examines both accounting-based and market-
based firm performance. Third, this study addresses the endogeneity issue between corporate 
governance factors and firm performance by using two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
and details the econometric tests for justifying the appropriateness of using 2SLS estimation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of 
corporate governance in Taiwan. Section 3 presents, in addition to the hypothesis development, 
the literature as to whether corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on firm 
performance. Section 4 explains the methodological aspects being used in the current study as 
well as discussing the variables used in developing the hypotheses. Section 5 reports our main 
findings, analyses of the statistical methods applied to the sample data, and the results of a 
variety of robustness tests. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional Setting: Corporate Governance in Taiwan 
Corporate governance became a major and debatable issue in Taiwan only at the beginning of 
the 21st century when the Taiwanese authorities, having learnt the lessons from the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 as well as many corporate scandals around the world, started to 
introduce and implement a series of corporate governance reforms. Due to the considerable 
attention on public companies, the reform laid emphasis on the improvement of the monitoring 
function that prevents self-dealing and deceptive misconduct by boards of directors and 
management (2009). These reforms, aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s corporate governance, 
and including amongst others the amendment of the Company Act, Securities and Exchange 
Act and other related regulations, the introduction of an independent director system1 and an 
audit committee, and the promotion of shareholders’ rights, were initiated in early 2002 by the 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), the predecessor of the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC), and were co-sponsored by other official institutions.  
As a result of a series of reforms, there have been two types of corporate governance structure 
for public companies in Taiwan since January 2007. The first type is the traditional existing 
board structure as required by the Company Act, which is based on the German civil law. 
Following the German system, the board structure of a Taiwanese company is a two-tier 
                                                 
1 Effective from February 2002, companies that apply for initial public offerings on the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
(TWSE) are required for the first time to appoint at least two independent directors, which is perhaps the most 
significant change of Taiwanese corporate governance framework. However, this regulation is not applied to 
existing listed companies, i.e. it is not mandatory for them to choose to appoint independent directors. 
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structure, which consists of a board of directors and supervisors2. The second type of board 
structure in Taiwan is a one-tier system as suggested by the Securities and Exchange Act, which 
is composed of a board of directors and an audit committee. The audit committee, consisting 
solely of three or more independent directors with at least one of them being specialized in 
accounting or finance, is organised in lieu of the board of supervisors.3 In summary, since the 
amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act in 2006, non-public companies still continue 
with the traditional two-tier board structure as required by the Company Act. As regards to 
public companies, if not mandated by the competent authority to host independent directors or 
to set up an audit committee, they have the alternative of selecting their own internal corporate 
structure.4 
In Taiwan, the majority of firms are in the form of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
The board of directors in SMEs tends to be family dominated, implying that companies in 
Taiwan have few outside directors who are not members of the family or business associates. 
As for listed companies, family control is still a dominant characteristic, and Yeh et al. (2001) 
report that 51.4% of Taiwanese listed companies are family controlled. Faccio et al. (2001) 
find that families with control/voting greater than their cash flow rights tend to expropriate 
wealth in East Asia. Similarly, in Taiwan, Yeh and Woidtke (2005) report that the average 
control rights of the largest shareholders are 30.33%, whereas the average cash flow rights are 
only 21.68%. Thus this discrepancy (an excess control of 8.66%) provides an incentive for 
controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth by seeking private interests at the expense of 
minority investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In recent years, due to the guidance of the 
government policy and related regulations, and the considerable transformation of industry 
structure from labour-intensive to high-tech, there has been a trend towards separation of 
ownership and control although the discrepancy still exists. 
According to the report of Investors Structure in terms of Trading Value on TWSE Market 
prepared by the Securities and Futures Bureau of the FSC, institutional investors constituted 
43.2% of the total trading value in December 2015, whilst individual investors constituted the 
major portion of 56.8%, implying that individual investors are the main participants in the 
Taiwan stock market. Due to their extremely small shareholdings, individual investors often 
renounce their voice in company operations, which leads to neglect in enhancing corporate 
governance by the listed companies. Coffee (1991) argues that institutional investors are more 
active and have greater needs for better corporate governance. However, in Taiwan, due to 
restrictions in the shareholding limit and holding period, the institutional shareholders play a 
more inactive role in corporate governance than those in the developed countries where the 
institutional investors actively promote the importance of corporate governance (Admati et al., 
1994; Bathala and Rao, 1995). 
Taiwan opened its securities market for foreign investment in three stages. In 1982 foreign 
investment in the securities market was allowed indirectly through investment funds only. In 
1990 foreign institutional investors were allowed to invest directly in the securities market and 
in 1996 the Taiwan securities market was opened for all foreign institutional and individual 
investors. In the Taiwanese market, foreign investors’ ownership is lower than that of domestic 
investors, but their trading actions dramatically affect the investment decisions of domestic 
investors through their ability to monitor corporate strategy, capital usage and personnel (Chen 
et al., 2009). In addition, the media regularly report that the stock price performance is 
                                                 
2 In this type, companies can be further divided into two groups: companies with independent directors and 
companies without independent directors. 
3 See Article 14-4, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Securities and Exchange Act. 
4 See Article 14-2, Paragraph 1, of the Securities and Exchange Act. 
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positively correlated with the level of foreign ownership. Consequently, due to their great 
influence on Taiwan’s capital markets, foreign investors play a critical role in improving 
Taiwanese firms’ corporate governance. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Board Characteristics and Firm Performance 
With regard to board independence, agency theory conjectures that outside directors would 
carry out their tasks to monitor top management because they have incentives to develop 
reputations in decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and therefore the probability of 
collusion and expropriation of shareholder wealth by top management might be lowered with 
a greater proportion of outside directors on the board, which would then minimise the agency 
costs (Fama, 1980). In addition, prior studies document that independent directors improve the 
quality of financial statements (Beasley, 1996; Chen et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2008; Peasnell 
et al., 2005). Moreover, previous literature points out that outside-dominated boards are more 
likely than inside-dominated boards to make better decisions in a variety of contexts, such as 
replacing CEOs in response to poor performance (Weisbach, 1988), resisting demands for 
greenmail payments (Kosnik, 1987), and making better acquisition deals (Byrd and Hickman, 
1992; McDonald et al., 2008). However, findings to date on the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance or value in developed markets (e.g., US and UK) are still 
mixed. 
As regards the positive effect of board independence on firm value, Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
indicate that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors have a superior accounting 
performance record, by using a sample of 266 major US business corporations over the period 
1970–1980. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) examine the effect of the appointment of outside 
directors on shareholder wealth by using a sample of 1,251 announcements from the Wall 
Street Journal and CRSP over the 1981–1985 period, and find that the addition of an outsider 
director increases firm value. Similarly, Dahta and McConnell (2005) also find that appointing 
outside directors is directly related to stock price reactions in the UK. In addition, Chung et al. 
(2003) argue that outside directors affect firm performance positively through their ability to 
provide effective monitoring activities. Dahya and McConnell (2007) examine the association 
between changes in board composition and firm performance in the UK from 1989 to 1996. 
Their results reveal that firms which conform to the Cadbury Report recommendation to have 
at least three outside directors show an improvement in operating performance. In contrast, 
however, some studies find no significant explanatory power of board independence on firm 
performance (Dahya et al., 2016; Fosberg, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Klein, 1998; 
Lefort and Urzúa, 2008; Mehran, 1995; Prevost et al., 2002; Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn, 
2010), and yet others even report a negative relationship between board independence and firm 
performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2001; Cavaco et al., 2017; Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2003; Mangena et al., 2012; Yermack, 1996; Zhou et al., 2018). 
Unlike the inconclusive empirical results in the developed markets, evidence in newly-
developed markets and developing markets is more consistent. For example, using a sample of 
1,834 observations over the period 1999–2002, Choi et al. (2007) investigate the valuation 
impacts of independent directors in Korea in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and 
indicate that the effect of independent directors on firm performance is significantly positive. 
In addition, using a sample of 347 firms in 1999, Cho and Kim (2007) analyse the linkage 
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between outside directors and firm performance during the governance reform movement 
undertaken in Korea. The results show that outside directors have a significantly direct impact 
on firm performance. In their analysis of 799 firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 
countries in 2002, Dahya et al. (2008) conclude that the association between corporate value 
and the percentage of independent directors is positively significant, especially in countries 
with weaker governance. Similarly, using a sample of 157 non-financial Indian companies for 
the year 2008, Kumar and Singh (2012) report that the proportion of independent directors has 
a positive but statistically weak effect on firm value. 
Based on the results and arguments demonstrated in the prior studies discussed above, agency 
theorists underline the positive effect of a higher proportion of outside directors on firm 
performance. Therefore, in accordance with Agency theory and the argument that independent 
directors bring about a more powerful board in developing markets, we expect that the potential 
costs of increasing the number of independent directors on the board are less than the potential 
benefits for the Taiwanese market. That is to say, there is a positive firm performance effect 
related to the appointment of independent directors for Taiwanese firms, which suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
H1a: Board independence is positively associated with firm performance. 
In addition to the board of directors, firms in Taiwan have a board of supervisors, functioning 
in a capacity equivalent to an audit committee as required in other jurisdictions. The primary 
responsibilities and powers of these supervisors are to investigate and oversee directors’ 
behaviour, audit firms’ financial reports, and scrutinize firms’ operations at any time. However, 
independent directors do not have equivalent supervisory powers held by independent 
supervisors according to the Company Act. The major function of independent directors is to 
attend the meeting of the board of directors, and supply their expert and independent opinions 
regarding important corporate activities as listed in Article 14-3 of the Securities and Exchange 
Act. In addition, unlike independent directors, supervisors may attend the board meeting, but 
they do not have the right to vote on the board of directors. 
The relationship between a two-tier board structure and firm performance for Taiwan-listed 
firms has not been widely investigated. However, similar to independent directors, supervisors 
are also important monitors of the firm; hence we expect to find that firms with a two-tier board 
system outperform those with a one-tier board system. Consistent with this argument, using 
the largest 250 publicly traded French non-financial firms from 2006 to 2008, Rouyer (2016) 
documents that a supervisory board is positively correlated with firm performance. In addition, 
Young et al. (2008) find that the more the independent supervisors on the board, the higher the 
firm performance, by using a sample of 492 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange for the 
years 2001 and 2002. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1b: The proportion of independent supervisors is positively associated with firm 
performance. 
The board of directors is considered as an institution to mitigate the effect of agency problems 
between the owners and managers (Drakos and Bekiris, 2010). As boards are supposed to be 
large decision-making groups, size may affect the decision-making process and effectiveness 
of the board (Dwivedi and Jain, 2005). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that an ideal board 
size should be around eight or nine directors, whilst Jensen (1993) indicates that a board size 
of seven or eight is optimal. The optimal size of the board and its effect on firm performance 
have been issues of frequent debate over the years, but the literature shows mixed empirical 
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results. Proponents of small boards argue that smaller boards are more cohesive and effective 
in decision making (Jensen, 1993), impartial in evaluations of managerial performance (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992), and easier to coordinate but difficult for the CEO to control (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Jensen, 1993). This argument is supported by several empirical studies. For 
example, Yermack (1996) finds a negative relationship between board size and firm value (as 
measured by Tobin’s Q) in a sample of 452 large US industrial companies over the period 
1984–1991. Also, in their study of 460 firms in Singapore and Malaysia for the years 1999 and 
2000, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) report an inverse association between board size and firm value. 
In addition, De Andres et al. (2005) report a negative relationship between firm value and the 
size of board of directors in a sample of 450 non-financial firms from ten countries in Western 
Europe and North America for the year 1996. In an analysis of 347 companies listed on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2000, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find board size 
to be negatively associated with market performance measures based on Tobin’s Q. Similarly, 
Cheng (2008) uses a sample of 1,252 US firms over the period 1996–2004 to investigate the 
relationship between board size and the variability of firm performance, and concludes that 
firm performance is negatively related to board size. Dahya et al. (2008) also find a negative 
correlation of Tobin’s Q with board size in a sample of 799 firms from 22 countries in 2002. 
Moreover, using a sample of 492 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange for the years 2001 
and 2002, Young et al. (2008) reveal that firm performance is inversely associated with board 
size. In his study of a large sample of 2,746 firms in the UK between 1981 and 2002, Guest 
(2009) shows that the linkage between board size and firm performance is significantly 
negative. More recently, Drakos and Bekiris (2010), using a sample of 1,409 firm-year 
observations for the years 2000 to 2006, document that the relationship between board size and 
firm performance is inversely significant in Greece. Analysing a sample of 23 Tunisian listed 
firms over the period 1998–2009, Turki and Sedrine (2012) also find that board size has a 
significantly inverse impact on firm performance. Additionally, in their study on the top 100 
firms in the European Union for the period 2004–2015, Green and Homroy (2018) report an 
inverse relationship between board size and firm performance. 
On the contrary, proponents of large boards argue that they may be valuable to some companies 
as they provide more monitoring resources (Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn, 2010), bring 
more experience and knowledge (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Mangena et al., 2012), and 
support diversity that helps companies to reduce environmental uncertainties and obtain key 
resources (Goodstein et al., 1994; Pearce and Zahra, 1992), all of which may enhance firm 
performance (Choi et al., 2007; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Lefort and Urzúa, 2008; Ramdani 
and van Witteloostuijn, 2010). However, Dahya and McConnell (2007), Wintoki et al. (2012), 
and Delis et al. (2017) find no association between board size and firm performance. 
Although the empirical evidence on the relationship between board size and firm performance 
is still inconclusive, Agency theory argues that larger board size increases agency cost and 
monitors the firm improperly. In addition, Lipton and Lorsch (1992), and Jensen (1993), also 
suggest that as board size increases beyond a certain point, it affects firm performance in an 
inverse direction, and leads to a free rider problem among the many board directors. Taken 
together, the following hypothesis is then proposed: 
H1c: Board size is negatively associated with firm performance. 
A further board structure control mechanism relates to board leadership or role duality, which 
exists when a chief executive officer (CEO) also serves as the chairman of the board (COB). 
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Jensen (1993) indicates that when someone holds these two top important positions 
simultaneously, internal control mechanisms fail, i.e. the function of the board as a monitor of 
the CEO is weaker. Similarly, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that combining the decision 
management and decision control power lowers a board’s effectiveness in monitoring the CEO, 
which might lead to worse firm performance. 
Empirical evidence of the effect of CEO duality on firm performance has yielded conflicting 
results. Rhoades et al. (2001) find that firms with a separation of CEO and COB consistently 
have higher performance than those that have the two roles combined. Similarly, analysing a 
sample of 412 Hong Kong listed firms from 1995 to 1998, Chen et al. (2005) find a negative 
association between CEO duality and firm performance. In addition, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
indicate that board leadership is negatively and significantly associated with accounting 
performance, using a sample of 347 Malaysian listed companies between 1996 and 2000. 
Likewise, using a sample of US firms included in the S&P 100 Index over the period 1994–
2003, Cornett et al. (2008) detect an inverse impact of role duality on firm performance. 
In contrast to the studies supporting a negative correlation between CEO duality and firm 
performance, some empirical studies find no relationship between the dual role of a leadership 
structure and firm performance (Belkhir, 2009; Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Drakos and 
Bekiris, 2010; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Weir et al., 2002; Wintoki et al., 2012; Young et al., 
2008), while others support the notion that firms which combine the roles of CEO and the 
chairman of the board outperform those with separated roles (Ahmadi et al., 2018; Al Farooque 
et al., 2007; Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn, 2010; Tian and Lau, 2001). 
Although empirical studies on the role-duality and firm-performance relationship have 
documented mixed findings, Agency theory argues that a separation of the CEO and COB is 
important to develop effective monitoring by the board, which may impact positively on firm 
performance (Dayton, 1984; Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn, 2010). Therefore, it is proposed 
that the combination of CEO and board chairman positions would lead to a detriment of firm 
performance, which suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1d: Board leadership is negatively associated with firm performance. 
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
Ownership concentration (in the form of block-holders’ ownership) is one of the key 
determinants of corporate governance. The literature documents that the impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance ranges from positive to negative. On the one hand, since 
block-holders can receive a large proportion of firm profits, they have extremely strong 
incentives to monitor insiders in order to alleviate agency problems (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the value of 
the firm increases with ownership concentration as long as the change in ownership aligns the 
interests of management and shareholders. Consistent with this view, Claessens and Djankov 
(1999), using a sample of 706 Czech firms from 1992 to 1997, find that the more concentrated 
the ownership, the higher the firm profitability. Moreover, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) indicate 
that there is a positive relationship between block-holders’ ownership and firm performance in 
Malaysia and Singapore. Similarly, using a sample of 347 Malaysian listed companies between 
1996 and 2000, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) suggest that the impact of block-holders’ ownership 
on accounting performance is significantly positive. Cho and Kim (2007) also find a positive 
relationship between block-holders’ ownership and firm performance in Korea. Furthermore, 
in Taiwan, Young et al. (2008) report that firm performance is positively related to block-
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holders’ ownership. Omran et al. (2008) point out that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance is significantly positive. Paniagua et al. (2018) also 
document that ownership dispersion is negatively associated with firm performance in their 
study of a random sample of 1207 companies from 59 countries. 
On the other hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that if the ownership concentration increases 
to such a level that it entrenches the management and prevents takeovers, then firm 
performance falls. In addition, large shareholders who are forced into voting with management 
and find it beneficial to collaborate with management might cause poor firm performance due 
to less effective monitoring and high risk exposure (Brickley et al., 1988; Pound, 1988). 
Supporting evidence provided by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) indicates that the higher the 
ownership concentration, the lower the firm performance in the US. Similarly, Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) point out that block-holders’ ownership is negatively associated with firm 
performance, in a sample of 508 firms listed on the Fortune 500 over the period 1994–2000. 
Moreover, using a panel data of 160 Chilean companies from 2000 to 2003, Lefort and Urzúa 
(2008) show that firm performance is negatively related to ownership concentration. Belkhir 
(2009) and Ducassy and Montandrau (2015) also reports an inverse impact of block-holders’ 
ownership on firm performance.  
Although the findings of empirical research on the impact of block-holders’ ownership on the 
firm performance are mixed, in order to adhere to Agency theory and the argument that 
shareholders with only small stakes in a corporation fail to monitor management efficiently, 
we expect that the more the ownership concentration, and hence the stronger the monitoring 
function, the higher the firm performance. The above argument suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
H2a: Block-holders’ ownership is positively associated with firm performance. 
Admati et al. (1994) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that institutional investors have 
strong incentives to mitigate managerial opportunism and control managers’ exploitation of 
investors. In addition, Coffee (1991) and Choi et al. (2007) suggest that institutional investors 
may assist independent directors in their monitoring and thereby contribute to firm 
performance. Consistent with these arguments, McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a direct 
linkage between institutional ownership and firm performance for US firms. Moreover, 
Filatotchev et al. (2005) show that the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance is significantly positive, using a dataset of 228 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange in 1999. 
Piesse et al. (2007) also use a Taiwanese dataset and find that the higher the institutional 
ownership, the higher the firm’s performance. Similarly, using a sample of 943 firm-year 
observations for the years 2001 and 2002, Young et al. (2008) report that firm performance 
improves with institutional ownership in Taiwan. Furthermore, analysing a sample of 1,834 
Korean firm-year observations from 1999 to 2002, Choi et al. (2007) indicate that institutional 
ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. Omran et al. (2008) suggest that firm 
performance is positively related to institutional ownership, with a sample of 304 firms from 
four Arab countries over the 2000–2002 period. Lin and Fu (2017) also suggest a positive 
impact of institutional ownership on firm performance in China for the period 2004–2014. 
Based on the above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2b: Institutional ownership is positively associated with firm performance. 
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Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) argue that the role of foreign investors is similar to that of 
institutional investors. In addition, foreign investors usually have less connection with insiders 
than domestic investors, and hence they may monitor insiders more effectively (Chen et al., 
2009). Therefore, it is expected that foreign ownership also has a positive impact on firm 
performance. Supporting evidence is provided by several studies. For example, using a sample 
of 340 large listed Indian firms over the period 1997–2001, Dwivedi and Jain (2005) find that 
foreign shareholding is positively associated with firm performance. Moreover, Cho and Kim 
(2007) indicate that firm performance is directly related to foreign investor ownership, with a 
sample of 347 firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange in 1999. 
Similarly, Choi et al. (2007) document that foreigners have a positive impact on firm 
performance in Korea, using a sample of 1,834 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2002. 
Furthermore, Omran et al. (2008) work with a sample of 304 firms from four Arab countries 
for the period 2000–2002, and report that there is a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance. Recently, analysing a sample of Taiwanese firms conducting 
seasoned equity offerings over the 1991–2002 period, Chen et al. (2009) point out that the 
impact of foreign ownership on post-issue operating performance is significantly positive. 
Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) also indicate that foreign ownership has a direct impact on firm 
performance by using a sample of Italian list firms between 2007 and 2013. The above 
arguments and empirical findings lead us to the following hypothesis: 
H2c: Foreign ownership is positively associated with firm performance. 
The expected relationship between a family-controlled firm and performance is unclear. On the 
one hand, families have a powerful incentive to expropriate wealth by seeking private interests 
at the expense of minority investors (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence, 
unlike the traditional agency problem between managers and shareholders, the agency conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders might be more prevalent in family-
controlled firms (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). For example, using a sample of 5,897 financial 
and non-financial corporations in East Asia and Western Europe, Faccio et al. (2001) find that 
families with control greater than their cash flow rights tend to expropriate wealth. Therefore, 
family ownership might affect firm performance negatively (Choi et al., 2007; Jaskiewicz et 
al., 2017; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). On the other hand, families also have strong incentives to 
monitor managers and decrease agency costs since families have usually invested most of their 
private wealth in the company (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In addition, if monitoring activities 
need knowledge and information about the firm’s technology, families might also have an 
advantage due to their close and lengthy involvement with the firm (Andres, 2008; Filatotchev 
et al., 2005; Piesse et al., 2007). As a result, a family-controlled firm may provide a competitive 
advantage and improve firm performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). A number of other 
empirical studies also show that family ownership is correlated with better performance 
(Bonilla et al., 2010; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Hsu et al., 2018; Joh, 2003; Maury, 2006; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Wang and Shailer, 2017). When all the evidence is taken together, 
since the impact of family ownership on firm performance is an empirical issue, the following 
hypothesis is then proposed: 
Although the empirical evidence on the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance is still inconclusive, agency theorists argue that family firms need not incur 
significant agency cost (Schulze et al., 2001). In addition, Villalonga and Amit (2006) suggest 
that the owner-manager agency problem in nonfamily firms is more costly than the agency 
problem between family and minority shareholders in founder-CEO firms. Therefore, in 
accordance with agency theory and the above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
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H2d: Family ownership is positively associated with firm performance. 
4. Research methodology 
In order to investigate the hypotheses developed in the previous section, this study uses a 
dataset of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) with fiscal year ending on 31st 
December for the years 1997–2015. Financial statements, stock prices, board characteristics, 
and ownership structure data are drawn from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. 
Table 1 provides details about the sample selection process. The preliminary sample size for 
firms listed on the TWSE from 1997 to 2015 is 12,680. We then exclude 645 observations for 
firms in the financial, securities and insurance industries, and 186 observations for foreign 
firms issuing depository receipts in Taiwan, because their regulatory and reporting regimes are 
considerably different from firms in other industries. We further exclude 625 observations for 
firms listed less than one year or firms with incomplete financial, stock price and corporate 
governance data. In addition, we exclude 1,073 observations for firms representing the lowest 
and highest one percent in the sample (i.e. outliers). The full sample size after this selection 
process thus consists of 10,151 firm-year observations, an unbalanced panel data of different 
numbers of firms from 1997 to 2015. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
Given that our dataset is an unbalanced panel data of different numbers of firms over a 18-year 
period from 1997 to 2015, we employ the panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section 
and time-series nature of the data.5  In addition, we include industry dummy variables to control 
for industrial effects. Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is adopted to categorise our 
sample firms under nine industries: oil and gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, 
health care, consumer services, telecommunications, utilities, and technology. Therefore, eight 
dummies are constructed. Finally, we also use year dummy variables in the model to capture 
the regulation effect which may affect the outcome variable. The following equation for the 
industry- and year- fixed effects model (also called a two-way fixed effects model) is specified: 
PERF𝑖𝑡 = α0 + α1INDBOD_R𝑖𝑡 + α2TIER𝑖𝑡 + α3BODSIZE𝑖𝑡 + α4DUALITY𝑖𝑡
+ α5BLOCKOWN𝑖𝑡 + α6INSTOWN𝑖𝑡 + α7FOROWN𝑖𝑡
+ α8FAMOWN𝑖𝑡 + ∑αCONTROLS𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
(1)  
Where PERFit  is the firm performance, which is measured using both accounting-based 
measures (i.e., return on assets and return on equity), backward and inward indicators that 
represent the past results, and market-based measures (Tobin’s Q and market-to-book value of 
                                                 
5 Given our dataset, two potential regression models, i.e., the fixed effects and random effects model can be used 
in the econometric analysis. Unlike the random effects model which requires that the individual effects are random 
and uncorrelated with explanatory regressors included in the model, the fixed effects model assumes that the 
individual heterogeneity is associated with independent variables (Baltagi, 2005). In order to decide whether fixed 
effects or random effects model is more appropriate for our dataset, we perform the Hausman (1978) specification 
test where the null hypothesis is that both fixed and random effects are consistent. The result (𝒳2 = 65.51, p = 




equity), forward-looking indicators that reflect the expected future earnings by the market. 
Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by the book 
value of average total assets (Cho and Kim, 2007; Klein, 1998; Mangena et al., 2012; Ramdani 
and van Witteloostuijn, 2010). Return on equity (ROE) is measured as the ratio of net income 
divided by the book value of average total equity (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Daily and 
Dalton, 1992; Ghosh, 2006; Omran et al., 2008; Tian and Lau, 2001). Tobin’s Q (Q) is 
calculated as the sum of the market value of common shares and the book value of total debt 
divided by the book value of total assets, which is consistent with prior studies (Andres, 2008; 
Bozec et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2007; Dahya et al., 2008; Young et al., 2008). Market-to-book 
value of equity (MBVE) is measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value 
of equity (Al Farooque et al., 2007; De Andres et al., 2005; Filatotchev et al., 2005; Lefort and 
Urzúa, 2008; Turki and Sedrine, 2012). 
The proportion of independent directors (INDBOD_R) is calculated as the ratio of the number 
of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. An independent 
director should meet all of the board independence criteria for being independent as stated in 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Regulations Governing Appointment of Independent Directors and 
Compliance Matters for Public Companies. The board structure (TIER) is a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if the firm’s board structure is a two-tier system, and 0 otherwise. Board size 
(BODSIZE) is measured as the total number of directors on the board. Board leadership 
(DUALITY) is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
of directors, and 0 otherwise. Block-holders’ ownership (BLOCKOWN) is measured as the 
proportion of shares owned by the ten largest outside shareholders or shareholders who hold at 
least 5% of shares outstanding. Institutional ownership (INSTOWN) is measured as the 
proportion of shares owned by institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders include 
both foreign and domestic financial institutions (e.g., investment trust funds, securities dealers). 
Foreign ownership (FOROWN) is measured as the proportion of shares owned by foreign 
shareholders. Foreign ownership includes shareholdings owned by foreign individuals and 
institutions such as asset management firms. Family ownership (FAMOWN) is measured as 
the proportion of shares owned by family members and other legal entities that are controlled 
by family members. Family members are relatives who hold positions in top management or 
on the board (Hsu et al., 2018). 
The reason for inclusion of the control variables (CONTROLS𝑖𝑡) in the regression models is 
that it can isolate the impact of other factors affecting firm performance and would highlight 
the relationship between board characteristics and ownership structure, and firm performance. 
Firm size (FIRMSIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
Larger firms find it easier to generate funds internally and to gain access to funds from external 
sources, which can have valuable effects on firm performance (Ng, 2005). However, larger 
companies are likely to be more diversified, and thus might be subjected to higher agency and 
bureaucratic costs (Choi et al., 2007; Fama and French, 1992). Therefore, we do not predict a 
sign for this variable. Growth opportunity (GROWTH) is measured as the ratio of current year 
sales minus prior year sales divided by prior year sales. Sales growth generally enhances the 
capacity utilisation rate, which spreads fixed costs over more revenue resulting in higher 
profitability (Amidu, 2007; Brush et al., 2000). Accordingly, GROWTH is predicted to be 
positively correlated with firm performance. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of total 
debt divided by the book value of total assets. LEV is used to gauge the firm’s ability to cope 
with business downturns. A firm with a high LEV ratio is more easily exposed to the danger 
of business shocks since it has less ability to repay debt. LEV could be harmful to the firm 
value because of the accompanying bankruptcy costs and the deterioration of underinvestment 
issues (McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Myers, 1977). Similarly, according to the pecking order 
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theory, debt is inversely associated with the profitability of the firm (Myers, 1984; Ng, 2005). 
Therefore, this study expects LEV to be negatively correlated with firm performance. Dividend 
payout ratio (DPAYOUT) is calculated by dividing cash dividend per share by earnings per 
share. Dividend is important to shareholders and prospective investors in showing the profits 
that a company is making. Arnott and Asness (2003) and Zhou and Ruland (2006) report that 
high-dividend-payout companies tend to experience strong future earnings growth. In contrast, 
Amidu (2007) finds a negative association between dividend payout ratio and firm performance 
(proxied by return on assets). Therefore, no sign is predicted for this variable. Firm age 
(FIRMAGE) is measured as the number of years that a firm has operated. FIRMAGE is 
included as a control variable because it is plausible that as the firm matures, it may become 
more complex, creating more agency problems (Choi et al., 2007; Denis and Sarin, 1999). 
Therefore, we employ FIRMAGE to control for the maturation effect on firm performance, and 
expect that firm performance is negatively related to firm age. Product market competition is 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and is calculated as the sum of squares of 
the market share for each firm in the industry in each year. The lower the HHI, the lower is the 
industry concentration, and hence the higher is the industry competition. Previous research 
indicates that high product market competition may ensure that management does not shirk its 
responsibilities (Machlup, 1967; Pant and Pattanayak, 2010). Pant and Pattanayak (2010) also 
argue that higher product market competition forces the managers/insiders to focus on high 
performance. Big-4 audit firm (BIG4) is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is audited 
by a Big-4 audit company, and 0 otherwise. Fan and Wong (2005) report that firm value 
measured by the market-to-book value ratio is positively correlated with the Big 5 auditor, 
suggesting a Big 5 premium. Therefore, a dummy variable, BIG4, is expected to be positively 
associated with firm performance. R&D ratio (RD) is calculated by dividing the ratio of R&D 
expenditure by total sales. Chung et al. (2003) and Sher and Yang (2005) find that firms with 
higher R&D expenditures perform better than those with lower R&D expenditures. However, 
there is also evidence of a negative relationship between investments in R&D and firm 
performance (Pearl, 2001). Accordingly, we employ RD as a control variable but do not predict 
the direction of the linkage between RD and firm performance. Table 1 below provides the 
definition of the research variables employed in the model. 
[insert Table 2 here] 
5. Results 
Table 3 below reports the descriptive statistics of the research variables used in this study for 
the full sample. In addition, we present the yearly mean values of the research variables in 
Table 4 below. With respect to firm performance variables, the results show that the average 
ROA is 5.26%, the average ROE is 7.18%, the average Tobin’s Q is 1.34, and the average 
market-to-book value ratio (MBVE) is 1.52. Additionally, the mean values of these 
performance variables show a downward trend from 1997 to 2000 due to the Asian financial 
crisis and the dot-com bubble, and then an upward trend until the financial “tsunami” in 2008. 
Given that Taiwan is an export-oriented country, it is plausible that the profitability of most 
Taiwanese firms is deeply affected by the global economic conditions. 
With respect to board characteristics variables, the proportion of independent directors 
(INDBOD_R) has an average of only 7.74% and a median of 0, indicating that there are still 
many Taiwanese companies which do not appoint independent directors, consistent with a 
study using Taiwanese firms by Young et al. (2008). As shown in Table 4, the average 
proportion of independent directors in Taiwan increases over the period, although it is 
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markedly lower than that in other countries; for example, the percentages are 56%, 41%, 46%, 
57% for the US (Boone et al., 2007), UK (Guest, 2008), Australia (Arthur, 2001) and Singapore 
(Mak and Li, 2001), respectively. 
As to the other board characteristics variables, the board structure (TIER) is on average 95.70% 
with a median of 1, implying that most companies’ board structure in the sample is a two-tier 
structure, consisting of a board of directors and supervisors. As regards the trend, the mean 
value decreases from 100% in 20066 to 79.20% in 2015. In addition, the average number of 
directors on the board (BODSIZE) is 9.69 (with a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 22), which 
is smaller than the mean numbers of 11.88 and 12.03 for listed firms in the US reported by 
Fitch and Shivdasani (2006) and in the UK reported by Andres et al. (2005), respectively. The 
mean number of board size declines from 10.50 in 1997 to 9.63 in 2000, and then remains 
relatively stable from 2001 onwards. Last but not least, approximately 27.80% of the sample 
firms’ CEOs are also the chairmen of the board of directors (DUALITY). The mean value 
increases from 21.10% in 1997 to 29.30% in 2015. 
In terms of ownership structure variables, the average block-holders’ ownership 
(BLOCKOWN) is 18.21%, with a maximum of 79.81%. The mean value increases from 9.91% 
in 1997 to 22.36% in 2015. In addition, the average (median) institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) is 2.16% (0.37%), which is considerably lower than the mean of 34.16% in the 
US (Linck et al., 2008). As regards the trend, the mean institutional ownership increases 
steadily from 1.72% to 3.23% over the period under study. Moreover, the average foreign 
ownership (FOROWN) is 9%, indicating that foreigners constitute only a small proportion of 
firm ownership for the sample companies. The mean value trend of foreign ownership shows 
a downward pattern from 1997 to 2001, and then begins an upward pattern from 2001 onwards. 
Lastly, based on the definition of this study, the average family ownership (FAMOWN) is 
28.58%, with a maximum of 95.56%. The mean value of family ownership remains relatively 
stable between 26% and 30% over the period. 
With respect to control variables, the average firm size (FIRMSIZE, natural logarithm of the 
book value of total assets) is 15.79 billion NTD (New Taiwan Dollars), the average growth 
opportunity (GROWTH) is 6.31%, the average debt ratio (LEV) is 37.39%, and the average 
dividend payout ratio (DPAYOUT) is 40.78%. In addition, the average product market 
competition (HHI, the sum of squares of the market share for each firm in the industry) is 0.15 
(with a minimum of 0.04 and a maximum of 0.93). 
[insert Table 3 here] 
[insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 reports the results of the Pearson correlation matrix amongst the independent variables 
used in the regressions for the full sample over the period 1997–2015. The correlation 
coefficients between all independent variables are small (with a maximum of 0.513), 
suggesting no multicollinearity problem.7 The highest correlation coefficient is the correlation 
                                                 
6 It was not until 2007, when the amendment of Securities and Exchange Act was effective, that listed 
companies in Taiwan had the option to choose from a one-tier or two-tier board structure. 
7 Multicollinearity may be a problem when the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.80 (Gujarati, 1995). The current 
study also uses the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to double-check for any multicollinearity issue. The largest 
VIF is for the firm size (FIRMSIZE) (1.78), whereas the lowest VIF is for the growth opportunity (GROWTH) 
(1.04). As a result, the VIFs vary from 1.04 to 1.78 (with a mean of 1.30, not reported in the table), which are all 
lower than the critical value of 10. Therefore, the regression models used to test the hypotheses are relatively free 
from multicollinearity problems. 
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between the firm size (FIRMSIZE) and the foreign ownership (FOROWN) (r = 0.513, p < 
0.01). In addition, the larger the firm size (FIRMSIZE), the larger the institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) (r = 0.301, p < 0.01), showing that large firms are more attractive to institutional 
and foreign investors. Moreover, block-holders’ ownership (BLOCKOWN) is positively 
related to family ownership (FAMOWN) (r = 0.390, p < 0.01), implying that firms with larger 
block-holders’ ownership are also family-dominated. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient 
between the proportion of independent directors (INDBOD_R) and the board structure (TIER) 
is negative (r = -0.512, p < 0.01), indicating that firms with a higher percentage of independent 
directors are more likely to have a one-tier board of directors. 
[insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 6 below provides the fixed effects regression results of firm performance on board 
characteristics, ownership structure and control variables. The regression results in columns 1 
and 2 are based on accounting measures for ROA and ROE, respectively. In terms of board 
characteristics variables, the coefficient of INDBOD_R is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% significance level for both ROA and ROE. The results support Hypothesis 1a and are 
in line with Cho and Kim (2007), suggesting that board independence does enhance firm 
performance. Hypothesis 1b is also accepted as the coefficient of TIER is positively and 
significantly associated with ROA and ROE at the 1% level. These results suggest that firms 
with a two-tier board system outperform those with a one-tier one. In addition, the coefficient 
of BODSIZE is negative and significant at the 1% level for both ROA and ROE. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1c is supported, indicating that the smaller the board size, the higher the firm 
performance, which is consistent with Guest (2009). Moreover, the coefficient of DUALITY 
is also negative and significant at the 1% level for both ROA and ROE, thus supporting 
Hypothesis 1d. These results are consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), and Cornett et al. 
(2008), indicating that firms with a combined position of CEO and chairman of the board have 
a lower performance than those with separate positions. 
With respect to ownership structure, the coefficient of BLOCKOWN is positive for both ROA 
and ROE, but only statistically significant at the 10% level for ROA. Thus Hypothesis 2a is 
partly supported, indicating that ownership concentration has a kind impact on firm 
performance among Taiwanese listed firms, consistent with Young et al. (2008). In addition, 
similar to the research of Filatotchev et al. (2005), the coefficient of INSTOWN is positive and 
significant at the 1% for both ROA and ROE. These results support Hypothesis 2b, implying 
that the institutional ownership has a favourable impact in enhancing firm performance. 
Moreover, the coefficient of FOROWN is positively and significantly related to both ROA and 
ROE at the 1% level, thus confirming Hypothesis 2c. The results are similar to those of Chen 
et al. (2009) which also reports the positive impact of foreign ownership on firm value. As to 
family ownership, the coefficient of FAMOWN also has a significantly positive association 
with  ROA and ROE at the 1% level. These results are in line with those of Andres (2008) and 
support Hypothesis 2d. Finally, as regards the control variables, we observe that FIRMSIZE, 
GROWTH, DPAYOUT, and BIG4 are positively correlated with both ROA and ROE, whereas 
LEV, HHI, and FIRMAGE are negatively associated with both ROA and ROE. In addition, 
RD is significantly and negatively related to ROE but not to ROA. 
The regression results based on market measures (i.e. Q and MBVE) are shown in columns 3 
and 4. With regard to board characteristics, the coefficient of INDBOD_R is positive and 
significant at the 1% level for both Q and MBVE. These results support Hypothesis 1a, 
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indicating that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the higher the firm 
performance, which is consistent with the studies of Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), and Choi et al. 
(2007). In addition, the coefficient of TIER is positively and significantly associated with Q 
and MBVE at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b is supported. 
Moreover, unlike the accounting-based measures, we find that Hypothesis 1c is not confirmed 
since the coefficient of BODSIZE is positively and significantly related to Q and MBVE at the 
5% significance level, suggesting that firms with a large board perform better, which is in line 
with Lefort and Urzúa (2008). As to board leadership, the coefficient of DUALITY is negative 
and significant at the 10% level. Therefore, Hypothesis 1d is accepted. 
In terms of ownership structure, similar to the results of accounting-based measures, we 
observe that Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d are all supported as each of the coefficients of 
BLOCKOWN, INSTOWN, FOROWN and FAMOWN is positive and significant at the 1% 
level for both Q and MBVE. These results are in line with those of Filatotchev et al. (2005), 
Choi et al. (2007) and Andres (2008). Lastly, when we look at the control variables, we find 
that GROWTH, DPAYOUT, BIG4 and RD are positively correlated with Q and MBVE, 
whereas FIRMSIZE, LEV, HHI, and FIRMAGE are negatively correlated with both Q and 
MBVE.8 
[insert Table 6 here] 
Robustness Test 
The panel regression results may suffer from the endogeneity problem. In this study, 
endogeneity of board characteristics and ownership structure variables through firm 
performance would imply that the panel regression estimates are biased and inconsistent, and 
therefore cannot be used to make inferences about the causality of the relationship. Accordingly, 
we use the IV method with a single-equation 2SLS estimation to address the endogeneity issue. 
The equation being employed to conduct the IV method is the same as equation (1). However, 
2SLS estimation may not bring better estimates than panel estimation since it is difficult to find 
theoretically and empirically appropriate instruments. 
Based on the data we have, we use several potential instrumental variables: lagged values of 
each of endogenous variables and dividend payout ratio (DPAYOUT) 9 , which might be 
correlated with the endogenous regressors (i.e. board characteristics and ownership structure 
variables), but not with the error terms. First, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) indicate that dividend 
payout policy is associated with board size, board independence, block-holders’ ownership, 
and family ownership. Second, in the presence of information asymmetry between managers 
and external shareholders, dividend payout policy can reduce the costs of agency conflicts by 
limiting resources available for use at the discretion of managers (Jensen, 1986; Mancinelli and 
Ozkan, 2006; Short et al., 2002). In addition, larger dividend payments might also be attractive 
to shareholders. 
The appropriateness of the chosen instrumental variables is then examined by the two 
specification tests: the test of weak instruments (i.e., relevance condition: the instrumental 
variables should be correlated with the endogenous regressor) and over-indentifying 
restrictions (i.e., exclusion condition: the instrumental variables should be uncorrelated with 
                                                 
8 Furthermore, we re-estimate all regressions by splitting the sample period into pre and post-financial periods. 
The untabulated results are qualitatively similar as compare to the full sample period. 
9 Other studies that have used lagged values as instruments for current values in an instrumental variables 
framework include Yermack (1996), Guest (2008), and Chen and Al-Najjar (2012). 
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the error term). The results of these tests are presented in the lower part of Table 7. First, the 
relevance condition is checked by the results from the first-stage linear regression of 2SLS 
estimation with the value for the Cragg-Donald F-statistic on the excluded instruments. The 
lower part of Table 7 shows that the Cragg-Donald F-statistic in which the instruments are 
jointly zero is 62.662 (significant at the 1% level), which is in excess of all the critical values 
from Table 5.2 of Stock and Yogo (2005), indicating that the chosen instrumental variables 
(i.e., lagged values of corporate governance factors and dividend payout ratio) are relevant and 
therefore there is no weak instruments problem. 
Second, the Hansen (1982) test for over-identifying restrictions is used to check whether the 
instrumental variables satisfy the exclusion condition. The test results in the lower part of Table 
7 reveal that the Hansen J-statistic, 𝒳2(1), is 0.863 (p = 0.353), 0.023 (p = 0.880), 1.496 (p = 
0.221), and 1.504 (p = 0.220) for ROA, ROE, Q and MBVE models, respectively. These results 
fail to disprove the null hypothesis that all instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the 
error term, which suggests that the selected instrumental variables are exogenous and valid. In 
addition, we also conduct the standard Hausman (1978) test to justify the employment of 2SLS 
estimation rather than panel regression estimation. The results of the Hausman F-statistic (F = 
9.112, 6.718, 8.275 and 6.450 for ROA, ROE, Q and MBVE models, respectively, p < 0.01) 
strongly contradict the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors are exogenous, which 
implies that the panel regression estimates are biased and inconsistent, and thus indicates the 
need for, and the appropriateness of using, 2SLS estimation. 
With regard to the results of 2SLS estimates, the second-stage firm performance equations are 
shown in columns 1–4 of Table 7. The signs of the coefficients on the independent and control 
variables in each equation are generally as predicted. In general, the 2SLS estimates are larger 
than those of panel regression estimation in Table 6. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 provide the regression results based on accounting-based measures 
for ROA and ROE, respectively. As far as corporate characteristics variables are concerned, 
we find, consistent with Cho and Kim (2007), that the coefficient of INDBOD_R is positively 
correlated with ROA and ROE at the 1% significance level. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a is 
supported, suggesting that firm performance increases significantly after an increase in the 
proportion of independent directors, similar to the results of panel regression estimation. In 
addition, the coefficient of TIER is positively and significantly related to ROA and ROE at the 
1% level, thus confirming Hypothesis 1b. The results are consistent with previous panel 
regression results, and show that firm performance is positively associated with a two-tier 
board structure. 
Moreover, similar to the results of panel regression estimation, the coefficient of BODSIZE is 
negative and significant at the 1% level for both ROA and ROE. The results support Hypothesis 
1c, indicating that board size is inversely associated with firm performance, which is in line 
with the studies of Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and Guest (2009). Furthermore, we observe that 
the coefficient of DUALITY is negatively and significantly related to both ROA and ROE at 
the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Therefore, Hypothesis 1d is accepted, suggesting that 
board leadership has a detrimental effect on firm performance, similar to the study of Cornett 
et al. (2008), and the results of panel regression models. 
In terms of ownership structure variables, the coefficient of BLOCKOWN is positive for both 
ROA and ROE, but only significant at the 1% level in the case of ROA, thus partly confirming 
Hypothesis 2a. In addition, consistent with previous panel regression estimation results, each 
of the coefficients of INSTOWN, FOROWN, and FAMOWN is positive and significant at the 
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1% level for both ROA and ROE. These results support Hypotheses 2b-2d, suggesting that all 
institutional, foreign and family ownership has a direct impact on firm performance, consistent 
with Filatotchev et al. (2005), Cho and Kim (2007), and Andres (2008). Finally, with respect 
to control variables, we find that RD is significantly and negatively correlated with ROE but 
not with ROA. In addition, ROA and ROE are positively related to FIRMSIZEK, GROWTH, 
DPAYOUT and BIG4, but negatively to LEV, HHI and FIRMAGE. 
The regression results based on market measures for Q and MBVE are shown in columns 3 
and 4, respectively. With regard to board characteristics, similar to the results of panel 
regression estimation, we find that the coefficient of INDBOD_R is positively and significantly 
associated with both Q and MBVE at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The results support 
Hypothesis 1a, suggesting that firm performance improves significantly with a higher 
proportion of independent directors, in line with those of Weir et al. (2002). Additionally, the 
coefficient of TIER is positively and significantly related to Q at least at the 5% level, but not 
significant for MBVE. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a is partly supported. 
Moreover, we find, unlike the results of accounting measures and those of panel regression 
estimation, that both of the coefficients of BODSIZE and DUALITY are insignificant, 
suggesting that both the size of board of directors and CEO duality are irrelevant to the 
determinants of firm performance. Therefore, Hypotheses 1c and1d are not supported. These 
results are similar to those of Kumar and Singh (2012), Drakos and Bekiris (2010), and Kiel 
and Nicholson (2003), but partly contradict the findings of Young et al. (2008). 
With regard to ownership structure variables, consistent with the results of accounting 
measures and those of panel regression estimation, each of the coefficients of BLOCKOWN, 
INSTOWN, FOROWN, and FAMOWN is positive and significant at the 1% level for both Q 
and MBVE. Thus all Hypotheses 2a-2d are supported again, implying that firm performance is 
positively affected by institutional, foreign, family and block-holders’ ownership, consistent 
with Maury (2006), Omran et al. (2008), and Villalonga and Amit (2006). Finally, as regards 
control variables, the present study observes that GROWTH, DPAYOUT, BIG4 and RD are 
positively associated with both Q and MBVE, whereas FIRMSIZE, LEV, HHI and FIRMAGE 
are negatively related to Q and MBVE models. 
[insert Table 7 here] 
6. Conclusion 
This paper assesses the impact of board characteristics, the internal corporate governance 
mechanism, and ownership structure, the external corporate governance mechanism, on firm 
performance. In contrast to prior evidence on western developed countries that show no linkage 
between independent directors and firm performance, our findings indicate that for both 
accounting-based measures and market-based measures, board independence has a significant 
and positive effect on firm performance in our study on Taiwanese firms. In addition, according 
to the Taiwanese context, we observe that firms with a two-tier board structure, composed of 
board of directors and supervisors, perform better than those with a one-tier board system. We 
also find that firm performance is positively related to block-holders’ ownership, institutional 
ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership. In contrast, consistent with agency theory 
arguing that larger board and CEO duality are ineffective in monitoring the firm due to a free 
rider problem and failure of internal control mechanisms (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 
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1992), our evidence points out that board size and the separation between chairman and CEO 
are negatively associated with firm performance in the context of Taiwan. 
Our findings have the following main implications. In contrast to the inconclusive empirical 
results on the impact of independent boards on firm performance in developed markets such as 
the UK, the findings of the current study, which show a significantly positive association 
between appointment of independent directors and firm performance, imply that the monitoring 
value of independent directors tends to be more significant in markets with weaker corporate 
governance mechanisms. Therefore, the corporate governance reform regarding the 
independent director system which is mandatory for newly-listed companies is a successful 
policy in Taiwan. However, we suggest that the regulatory authority should require all listed 
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Table 1 Sample Selection Process 
 Firm-year 
 observations 
Preliminary sample size (1997–2015) 12,680 
Less:  
Observations in the financial sector 645 
Observations in depository receipts sector 186 
Observations listed less than one year or observations with incomplete 
data regarding corporate governance information 625 
Outliers 1,073 





Table 2 Definition of the Research Variables 
   Expected 
Variables Acronym Definition sign 
Dependent variables  
Return on assets ROA The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over 
the book value of average total assets. 
 
Return on equity ROE The ratio of net income over the book value of 
average total equity. 
 
Tobin's Q Q The ratio of the sum of the market value of common 
shares and the book value of total debt over the 
book value of total assets. 
 
Market-to-book value of 
equity 
MBVE The market value of equity over the book value of 
equity. 
 
Board characteristics variables  
The proportion of 
independent directors 
INDBOD_R The proportion of independent directors over the 
total number of directors on the board. 
+ 
Board structure TIER A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s 
board structure is a two-tier system, and 0 
otherwise. 
+ 
Board size BODSIZE The total number of directors on the board. − 
Board leadership DUALITY A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board of directors, and 0 
otherwise. 
− 
Ownership structure variables  
Block-holders’ ownership BLOCKOWN The proportion of shares owned by the ten largest 
outside shareholders or shareholders who hold at 
least 5% of shares outstanding. 
+ 
Institutional ownership INSTOWN The proportion of shares owned by institutional 
shareholders. 
+ 
Foreign ownership FOROWN The proportion of shares owned by foreign 
shareholders. 
+ 
Family ownership FAMOWN The proportion of shares owned by family members 
and other legal entities that are controlled by 
family members. 
+ 
Control variables  
Firm size FIRMSIZE The natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets. 
? 
Growth opportunity GROWTH The ratio of current year sales minus prior year sales 
over prior year sales. 
+ 
Leverage LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets. − 





HHI The sum of the squares of the market share for each 
firm in the industry in each year. 
? 
Firm age FIRMAGE The number of years that a firm has operated. − 
Big-4 audit firm BIG4 A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s 
auditor is a Big-4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. 
+ 




Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Min. 25% Mean Median 75% Max. SD 
Dependent variables 
ROA (%) -22.870 1.730 5.255 5.080 9.230 27.410 7.105 
ROE (%) -61.860 2.000 7.180 7.570 14.260 41.060 12.295 
Q 0.191 0.904 1.336 1.132 1.532 10.315 0.719 
MBVE 0.000 0.831 1.516 1.228 1.854 14.612 1.088 
Board characteristics variables 
INDBOD_R (%) 0.000 0.000 7.738 0.000 18.182 62.500 11.761 
TIER 0.000 1.000 0.957 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.204 
BODSIZE 5.000 8.000 9.686 9.000 11.000 22.000 2.714 
DUALITY 0.000 0.000 0.278 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.448 
Ownership structure variables 
BLOCKOWN (%) 0.000 10.070 18.214 16.570 24.290 79.810 11.630 
INSTOWN (%) 0.000 0.000 2.160 0.370 2.870 62.260 3.706 
FOROWN (%) 0.000 0.720 9.006 4.070 11.460 92.850 12.560 
FAMOWN (%) 0.000 14.490 28.576 27.060 40.090 95.560 17.514 
Control variables 
FIRMSIZE 11.895 14.922 15.788 15.613 16.412 21.675 1.252 
GROWTH (%) -67.330 -8.030 6.310 3.170 16.290 176.380 26.801 
LEV (%) 5.450 25.550 37.387 36.960 48.190 81.250 15.620 
DPAYOUT (%) 0.000 0.000 40.776 40.269 71.250 200.000 37.471 
HHI 0.039 0.061 0.150 0.082 0.203 0.931 0.144 
FIRMAGE 2.137 19.512 29.389 28.504 38.101 69.715 12.696 
BIG4 0.000 1.000 0.850 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.357 
RD (%) 0.000 0.000 2.239 0.910 2.940 23.800 3.465 
Notes: N = 10,151. The definitions of the research variables are as follows. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over the 
book value of average total assets; ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of average total equity; Q is the ratio of the sum of 
the market value of common shares and the book value of total debt over the book value of total assets; MBVE is the market value of equity 
over the book value of equity; INDBOD_R is the proportion of independent directors over the total number of directors on the board; TIER 
is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s board structure is a two-tier system, and 0 otherwise; BODSIZE is the total number of 
directors on the board; DUALITY is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, and 0 
otherwise; BLOCKOWN is the proportion of shares owned by the ten largest outside shareholders or shareholders who hold at least 5% of 
shares outstanding; INSTOWN is the proportion of shares owned by institutional shareholders; FOROWN is the proportion of shares owned 
by foreign shareholders; FAMOWN is the proportion of shares owned by family members and other legal entities that are controlled by 
family members; FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; GROWTH is the ratio of current year sales minus 
prior year sales over prior year sales; LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets; DPAYOUT is the ratio of cash dividend per share to 
earnings per share; HHI is the sum of the squares of the market share for each firm in the industry in each year (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index); FIRMAGE is the number of years that the firm has operated; BIG4 is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is audited by 
Big-4 accounting firms, and 0 otherwise; RD is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. For the dummy (binary) variables, the mean 




Table 4 Yearly Mean Values of The Research Variables 
Variables 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Dependent variables 
ROA 6.769 4.234 4.386 4.768 3.607 4.467 5.838 6.387 5.379 6.662 7.158 3.666 5.385 6.819 5.138 4.271 4.648 5.125 4.645 
ROE 9.020 4.411 4.514 5.294 3.281 5.136 8.226 9.575 7.613 9.584 10.352 4.411 7.508 9.919 7.481 5.921 6.561 7.485 6.679 
Q 1.943 1.596 1.568 1.029 1.263 1.173 1.337 1.229 1.263 1.445 1.428 0.956 1.584 1.514 1.165 1.277 1.392 1.393 1.263 
MBVE 2.492 1.930 1.887 1.017 1.379 1.263 1.551 1.368 1.413 1.693 1.643 0.914 1.859 1.793 1.256 1.422 1.614 1.600 1.405 
Board characteristics variables 
INDBOD_R N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.251 4.875 6.733 7.695 7.883 7.537 7.701 8.038 8.080 9.090 11.021 12.297 13.558 18.244 
TIER 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.992 0.982 0.972 0.970 0.954 0.918 0.891 0.865 0.792 
BODSIZE 10.498 10.087 9.916 9.626 9.648 9.588 9.591 9.730 9.708 9.768 9.702 9.723 9.668 9.620 9.626 9.633 9.569 9.537 9.592 
DUALITY 0.211 0.229 0.237 0.297 0.285 0.284 0.294 0.295 0.281 0.290 0.278 0.289 0.265 0.264 0.271 0.280 0.281 0.280 0.293 
Ownership structure variables 
BLOCKOW
N 
9.909 11.000 11.838 13.200 13.576 14.733 17.650 16.596 17.470 17.628 18.824 19.229 19.623 19.341 20.523 21.042 21.765 21.915 22.356 
INSTOWN 1.723 1.775 1.840 1.580 1.543 1.734 1.548 1.708 1.876 1.871 2.226 2.219 2.183 2.054 2.141 2.359 2.770 3.099 3.231 
FOROWN 8.797 6.625 5.429 5.292 4.859 5.419 5.694 8.173 8.629 9.806 10.716 10.637 8.791 9.793 10.097 10.669 10.963 11.220 11.612 
FAMOWN 26.027 26.508 27.320 29.275 29.112 29.037 29.285 28.015 27.837 27.490 27.904 28.317 29.063 28.758 28.856 29.184 29.061 29.303 29.495 
Control variables 
FIRMSIZE 15.816 15.826 15.768 15.684 15.645 15.617 15.606 15.640 15.672 15.725 15.816 15.743 15.776 15.864 15.862 15.899 15.912 15.944 15.957 
GROWTH 14.639 9.815 8.919 15.718 -4.058 12.966 14.434 19.512 6.572 9.264 9.909 -0.481 -9.339 23.501 1.619 -0.058 1.506 3.709 -3.629 
LEV 37.191 37.406 39.008 40.413 40.305 40.696 41.006 40.676 39.138 37.193 36.252 35.949 34.512 35.147 35.992 35.788 36.287 35.913 36.320 
DAPYOUT 8.487 19.564 16.973 21.142 26.582 30.965 33.255 35.971 38.680 45.380 44.244 37.960 51.156 49.384 48.457 48.739 51.261 53.129 51.335 
HHI 0.154 0.158 0.212 0.214 0.170 0.133 0.133 0.144 0.145 0.140 0.145 0.152 0.135 0.135 0.149 0.148 0.142 0.146 0.149 
FIRMAGE 26.254 26.573 26.633 26.330 26.094 26.241 26.055 26.493 27.127 27.968 28.664 28.902 29.788 30.847 31.452 32.282 32.819 33.548 34.214 
BIG4 0.789 0.793 0.797 0.810 0.813 0.821 0.834 0.849 0.845 0.851 0.856 0.864 0.852 0.855 0.867 0.875 0.870 0.878 0.890 
RD 1.225 1.410 1.403 1.413 1.808 1.945 2.090 2.083 2.138 2.195 2.180 2.407 2.557 2.411 2.498 2.703 2.707 2.560 2.623 
N 247 275 320 374 432 476 541 562 569 582 598 610 615 626 652 649 652 689 682 




Table 5 Variance Inflation Factor and Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 Variables VIFs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 INDBOD_R 1.60 1               
2 TIER 1.42 -0.512a 1              
3 BODASIZE 1.18 -0.006 0.041a 1             
4 DUALITY 1.05 -0.009 0.044a -0.151a 1            
5 BLOCKOWN 1.33 0.072a -0.038a -0.143a 0.006 1           
6 INSTOWN 1.17 0.135a -0.123a 0.116a -0.038a 0.075a 1          
7 FOROWN 1.56 0.141a -0.155a 0.135a -0.050a 0.102a 0.258a 1         
8 FAMOWN 1.32 -0.053a 0.024b -0.067a -0.074a 0.390a -0.093a -0.153a 1        
9 FIRMSIZE 1.78 0.049a -0.161a 0.300a -0.131a -0.052a 0.301a 0.513a -0.070a 1       
10 GROWTH 1.04 -0.029a 0.052a -0.003 0.006 -0.044a 0.025b 0.015 -0.048a 0.051a 1      
11 LEV 1.23 -0.056a 0.020 b -0.003 -0.010 0.012 -0.044a -0.066a 0.013 0.185a 0.075a 1     
12 DPAYOUT 1.15 0.159a -0.065a 0.085a -0.049a 0.086a 0.154a 0.180a 0.037a 0.093a -0.013 -0.237a 1    
13 HHI 1.23 -0.232a 0.059a 0.126a -0.076a 0.048a -0.017c -0.067a 0.175a 0.062a -0.048a 0.027a 0.000 1   
14 FIRMAGE 1.33 -0.262a 0.082a 0.118a -0.045a 0.155a 0.004 0.027a 0.143a 0.140a -0.120a 0.004 0.056a 0.314a 1  
15 BIG4 1.10 0.147a -0.054a 0.041a -0.035a -0.005 0.107a 0.161a -0.034a 0.132a 0.013 -0.076a 0.094a -0.140a -0.157a 1 
16 RD 1.29 0.235a -0.097a -0.057a 0.051a -0.084a 0.042a 0.069a -0.209a -0.09a -0.034a -0.250a 0.066a -0.277a -0.297a 0.129a 




Table 6 Fixed Effects Regression Results of Firm Performance on Board 
Characteristics, Ownership Structure and Control Variables 
Independent Expected Accounting-based Performance Market-based Performance 
Variables Sign ROA ROE Q MBVE 
Constant ? 4.039 2.808 3.849*** 5.624*** 
  (2.547) (4.492) (0.271) (0.412) 
INDBOD_R + 0.045*** 0.083*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) 
TIER + 2.622*** 4.465*** 0.095*** 0.117** 
  (0.337) (0.594) (0.036) (0.054) 
BODSIZE − -0.066*** -0.126*** 0.006** 0.008** 
  (0.023) (0.041) (0.002) (0.004) 
DUALITY − -0.397*** -0.753*** -0.027* -0.035* 
  (0.129) (0.228) (0.014) (0.021) 
BLOCKOWN + 0.011* 0.002 0.003*** 0.004*** 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
INSTOWN + 0.147*** 0.204*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 
  (0.017) (0.029) (0.002) (0.003) 
FOROWN + 0.072*** 0.117*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
FAMOWN + 0.023*** 0.042*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) 
FIRMSIZE ? 0.254*** 0.462*** -0.053*** -0.084*** 
  (0.063) (0.111) (0.007) (0.010) 
GROWTH + 0.080*** 0.144*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV − -0.107*** -0.134*** -0.004*** 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) 
DPAYOUT ? 0.058*** 0.101*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI ? -2.697*** -5.104*** -0.268*** -0.428*** 
  (0.508) (0.896) (0.054) (0.082) 
FIRMAGE − -0.055*** -0.082*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
BIG4 + 0.541*** 1.341*** 0.026 0.072*** 
  (0.166) (0.293) (0.018) (0.027) 
RD ? 0.018 -0.093*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 
  (0.020) (0.034) (0.002) (0.003) 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.359 0.335 0.294 0.286 
Model F  133.286*** 119.713*** 99.372*** 95.356*** 
Notes: N = 10,151. The definitions of the research variables are the same as in Table 3. The values in parentheses are robust standard 




Table 7 2SLS Regression Results of Firm Performance on Board Characteristics, 
Ownership Structure and Control Variables 
Independent Expected Accounting-based Performance Market-based Performance 
Variables Sign ROA ROE Q MBVE 
Constant ? -4.612** -10.030** 2.691*** 3.928*** 
  (2.318) (4.225) (0.169) (0.286) 
INDBOD_R + 0.045*** 0.084*** 0.002** 0.002* 
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) 
TIER + 2.989*** 5.089*** 0.120** 0.137 
  (0.462) (0.769) (0.055) (0.087) 
BODSIZE − -0.097*** -0.185*** 0.003 0.003 
  (0.024) (0.044) (0.002) (0.004) 
DUALITY − -0.324** -0.558* -0.022 -0.031 
  (0.164) (0.286) (0.016) (0.024) 
BLOCKOWN + 0.026*** 0.022 0.005*** 0.007*** 
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) 
INSTOWN + 0.117*** 0.145*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 
  (0.022) (0.041) (0.002) (0.003) 
FOROWN + 0.052*** 0.086*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) 
FAMOWN + 0.021*** 0.039*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
  (0.004) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) 
FIRMSIZE ? 0.506*** 0.885*** -0.035*** -0.059*** 
  (0.073) (0.130) (0.007) (0.011) 
GROWTH + 0.080*** 0.144*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV − -0.107*** -0.139*** -0.004*** 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) 
DPAYOUT ? 0.059*** 0.104*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI ? -2.542*** -4.792*** -0.249*** -0.400*** 
  (0.453) (0.845) (0.040) (0.061) 
FIRMAGE − -0.054*** -0.081*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) 
BIG4 + 0.561*** 1.411*** 0.030** 0.082*** 
  (0.163) (0.319) (0.013) (0.021) 
RD ? 0.025 -0.084** 0.033*** 0.044*** 
  (0.023) (0.036) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.364 0.343 0.286 0.279 
Model F  102.382*** 82.887*** 67.267*** 68.649*** 
Cragg-Donald F-Statistic  62.662*** 62.662*** 62.662*** 62.662*** 
Hansen J-statistic  0.863 0.023 1.496 1.504 
  (p=0.353) (p=0.880) (p=0.221) (p=0.220) 
Hausman F-statistic  9.112*** 6.718*** 8.275*** 6.450*** 
Notes: N = 9,431. The definitions of the research variables are the same as in Table 3. The values in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. * Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
